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1. Introduction 
Governments that face tighter budget constraints or changing political majorities may con-
sider cutting subsidies. An example for such a behavior is a subsidy that is paid when a pri-
vate household builds a home to live in like the “First Time Buyers Program” in the USA or 
the “Eigenheimzulage” in Germany.  
 
The decision to invest in a private home is a decision under uncertainty that is partly irre-
versible (Henry 1974).1 Uncertainty may arise due to two factors:  Location and size.   
The investor is uncertain on the location of the house until he has specific information pertain-
ing to permanent employment.  Another variable is the number of rooms needed depending on 
the uncertain number of children. The investment in a house is partly irreversible because a 
family - specific design bears sunk costs. Specific taxes and costs of an estate agent are sunk 
as well.  Furthermore, there is the actual reality of new or older homes’ resale values being 
lower than their buying price, notwithstanding high repair costs of older homes also known as 
“Money Pits” (Akerlof 1970).  
 
On the other hand a household has the option to delay the investment. Delay increases utility 
(and thus cash flow) because new information improves the investment decision (McDon-
ald/Siegel 1986). Therefore, in addition to the decision rule “invest when the present value of 
the future cash flows is at least as large as the costs” the household should invest only if the 
net present value is at least as large as the net present value of the delayed investment 
(Pindyck 1991).  
 
Government subsidy grants may alter the decision to invest because the subsidy enlarges the 
                                                 
1 To get a cash flow presentation all scenarios that imply a utility change are identified with cash flows that lead 
to the same utility change. Such cash flows are called the monetary equivalent of a utility influencing scenario. 
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net present value of the house. For example, a permanently offered not too large subsidy 
would not change the timing of the investment. The announcement of a cut of the subsidy 
however may change the timing of the investment because the household has to choose be-
tween investing now and receiving the subsidy and investing later with better information but 
without a subsidy. We identify the conditions on households that would bring forward their 
investment if a subsidy cut were announced. This so-called Announcement Effect may be 
large enough so that the present value of subsidy payments for the government would rise 
with the announcement of the cut. A better strategy than cutting the subsidy completely is to 
cut the subsidy in parts small enough to prevent the Announcement Effect.  
It is well known that the option to delay an investment is valuable (McDonald/Siegel 1986). 
Teisberg 1993 shows that firms may delay investment or choose smaller, shorter-lead-time 
technologies when facing uncertain regulation. She considers an industry that faces the uncer-
tainty of frequent changes of regulation. We study the different case that a rationally expected 
change of policy may occur once only.   There is a large literature that deals with the possibil-
ity of trading off flexibility and commitment build on Spence (1979) and Fudenberg/Tirole 
(1983), for example Saloner (1987), Mailath (1993), Maggi (1996) and Sadanand/Sadanand 
(1996). However, we analyze investors that trade off subsidies and flexibility.  
 
2. The model 
We consider a representative household that can invest at only one point in time t = 0, t = 1, t 
= 2, … . The investment enlarges cash flows by X. Investment costs are denominated by I. 
New information is independently and identically distributed over time and arrives with prob-
ability P at each point in time prior to arrival. New information leads to a monetary equivalent 
Y if the investor decides to invest. Therefore, the investor invests in period t after the arrival of 
new information or after he knows that new information does not arrive in this period. The 
discount factor for expected cash flows and for one period is 1/(1+r). 
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The investment is subsidized by the government.. Once in his lifetime an investor gets a grant 
S at the time of the investment (case A). However, by reason of tighter budgetary constraints 
the government considers the termination of the subsidy. Because of legal issues, the govern-
ment has to announce that the subsidy is to be terminated. In this situation the government 
subsidizes the investment at time t = 0 but not later (case B). Investors do anticipate the cut 
and may bring forward the investment. For simplification we do not consider policy effects on 
market prices but assume X and I to be independent of the grant. 
 
We assume  
−I+X < 0, (1) 
i.e. without grant and without the additional information the investment is not profitable. If (1) 
does not hold no subsidy is necessary to induce investment. Since we consider a subsidy that 
is not completely needless assumption (1) is compulsive. 
 
If −I+X+S+Y < 0 the grant is to small to induce investment of the “lucky” household which 
received the information. No household invests and the grant is never paid. This case is irrele-
vant and therefore not further considered. 
 
First of all, we analyze case A. At each point in time, the investor faces an identical problem 
if he did not get any information up to this point in time. Thus, at each point in time (without 
information) the investor arrives at the same conclusion (to invest or not to invest). This im-
plies that the investor invests at t = 0 or at that future point in time the information arrives. 
The actual decision depends on the parameter constellation, i.e. the grant S. 
 
The value of investment at t = 0 without information obviously amounts to 
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−I+X+S. (2) 
If the investor realizes the investment when information arrives the present value of the cash 
flows can be calculated as follows: 
t 1
t
t 1
p ( I X S Y) p(1 p) ( I X S Y).
(1 r) r p
∞
−
=
⋅ − + + +
− ⋅ = ⋅ − + + +
+ +
∑  (3) 
Consequentially, the investor waits until information arrives if and only if  
pI X S ( I X S Y)
r p
p YS I X .
r
− + + < ⋅ − + + +
+
⋅
⇔ < − +
 (4) 
In case B we have to consider that subsidy is only granted at t = 0. Thus, the value of future 
investment in the case of information arrival is 
t 1
t
t 1
p ( I X Y) p(1 p) ( I X Y).
(1 r) r p
∞
−
=
⋅ − + +
− ⋅ = ⋅ − + +
+ +
∑  (5) 
In this situation the investor waits if and only if 
pI X S ( I X Y)
r p
pS I X ( I X Y).
r p
− + + < ⋅ − + +
+
⇔ < − + ⋅ − + +
+
 (6) 
Particularly, if the investor waits in case B he also waits in case A.  
 
On the basis of (4) and (6) we want to analyze which parameter constellations lead to an an-
nouncement effect. If (4) is not fulfilled the investor invests at t = 0 anyway. Under considera-
tion of (6) an announcement effect can only occur if S is sufficiently small to meet (4) and 
sufficiently large not to fulfill (6). Consequentially, we have an announcement effect if and 
only if  
p p YI X ( I X Y) S I X
r p r
⋅
− + ⋅ − + + < < − +
+
. (7) 
The optimal time of investment differs depending on the grant S (see figure 1). If the grant is 
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small the investor waits for information before he invests. If the grant is large the investor 
invests immediately even without information. However, if the grant is at medium level the 
announcement effect occurs. An announced cut causes the investment of households that oth-
erwise postponed the investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Investment behavior if the grant S is cut 
3 The Policy 
The question arises whether the Announcement Effect is large enough to increase the cost of 
the government. To put it into other words, may it more expensive to cut than to continue the 
grant? If we consider situations leading to no announcement effect the cut of subsidies has no 
influence on the investment behavior of the households and consequentially in these situations 
the cut improves the budget of the government. Therefore, we consider parameter constella-
tions leading to an announcement effect.  
 
In case A the fraction p of households invests at time t = 0 and the rest of the households in-
vest later (t ≥ 1) or never. Because an investment is accompanied with a grant the present 
value of government’s payments per household is 
t 1
t
t 1
p S p 1 rp S (1 p) (1 p) p S (1 p) S p S
(1 r) r p r p
∞
−
=
⋅ +
⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+ + +
∑ . (8) 
 
In case B all households invest at t = 0. The government has to pay S per household. Thus, the 
excess expenditure of the government when cutting the subsidy is 
… … 
S
p YI X
r
⋅
− +
pI X ( I X Y)
1 r
− + ⋅ − + +
+
0
invest anyway announcement 
effect 
wait for information 
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1 r 1 r 1 pS p S S 1 p S r 0
r p r p r p
⎛ ⎞+ + −
− ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ >⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠  (9) 
and the Announcement Effect enlarges the payments of the governments. Immediate cutting 
subsidies do not improve the budget but enlarges the deficit.  
 
Consequentially, the question arises if it is possible to design an alternative cutting rule and an 
alternative sequence of subsidies (St)t=0,1,…, respectively, that leads to a reduced deficit. Firstly, 
we have to characterize the announcement effect for such a generalized situation. Analogical 
to (7) an announcement effect at a point in time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …} exists if the investor does not 
wait until information arrives, i.e. 
t 1
t t
t 1
t
1
p ( I X S Y)S I X (1 p)
(1 r)
r p p 1 p(I X) Y S ,
r p r p 1 p 1 r
∞
τ− − τ
τ−
τ= +
τ
∞
+τ
τ=
⋅ − + + +
> − + − ⋅
+
−⎛ ⎞
= − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟+ + − +⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 (10) 
and the investor does not invest anyway (i.e. in case A) which is characterized by (4). Against 
this background we develop an optimal cutting rule in order to minimize the present value of 
subsidies (see the appendix for details):  
0
t t
t 1 t t
t
S S;
1 r p(1 r) S S (r p) if S S S,
1 r
1 r 1 r pS (S S) if S S S S,
p 1 r
0 if S S;
+
=
+ +⎧
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + > ⋅ ⋅⎪ +⎪
+ + +⎪
= − ⋅ < ≤ ⋅ ⋅⎨
+⎪⎪ ≤⎪⎩
 (11) 
with S (I X) (r /(r p)) Y (p /(r p))= − ⋅ + + ⋅ + . This policy is characterized by cutting the subsidy 
each period as much as possible to avoid the announcement effect. In each period the gov-
ernment is able to cut the subsidies to some extend. The increments are monotonically de-
creasing. Even if all households rationally expect the cutting rule the government is able to 
abolish the subsidy in finite time.  
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4. Summary 
If governments want to cut subsidies they may fear the Announcement Effect: Investors real-
ize an investment they would have postponed only to get a subsidy if the cut were not an-
nounced. This paper identifies the parameter constellations of when the cut of a subsidy does 
not improve the budget but enlarges the deficit.  
The announcement effect interval is rather relevant from a political economy point of view. 
Voters are in favor of a grant because they seek windfall gains. However, if the grant is so 
large that anybody invests even without information the grant results in inefficient investment 
on the part of the government.  This results in negative publicity such that a political majority 
is at risk. Therefore, for the rent seekers the optimal permanent grant is to be as large as pos-
sible but small enough to prevent obviously inefficient investment. The politically optimal 
grant is in the Announcement Effect interval.  
In such a situation it is better not to cut the subsidy completely. However, the government is 
able to avoid the negative effects of the announcement and to improve the budget by follow-
ing the optimal cutting rule (11). Following the rule the government cuts the grant incremen-
tally and abolishes it in finite time. 
 
 
Appendix (Derivation of (11)) 
The government minimizes the present value of grant payments  
1 2
1
0S , S , 1
p Smin p S (1 p) (1 p)
(1 r)
∞
τ− τ
τ
τ=
⋅
⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅
+
∑…  
respectively 
1 2S , S , 1
1 pmin S
1 r
τ
∞
τ
τ=
−⎛ ⎞
⋅⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑…  (A.1) 
 8
s.t.  
0S S,=  (A.2) 
i.e. the grant-sequence (St)t=0,1,… starts with the present grant S, 
t t
1
r p p 1 p0 S (I X) Y S , t 0, 1, ... .
r p r p 1 p 1 r
τ
∞
+τ
τ=
−⎛ ⎞≤ ≤ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =⎜ ⎟+ + − +⎝ ⎠∑  (A.3) 
i.e. (according to (10)) the investor waits until information arrives which corresponds with no 
announcement effect at t = 0, 1, 2, … . 
 
We use S (I X) (r /(r p)) Y (p /(r p))= − ⋅ + + ⋅ + , b p /(1 p)= −  and q = (1 p) /(1 r)− +  as abbre-
viations. Since we know from (6) there is no announcement effect in the case tS S≤  if we set 
St+1 = St+2 = … = 0. Thus, in following we consider the case 
tS S> . (A.4) 
According to (A.3) at a point in time t and given subsidy tS S>  a necessary condition for the 
optimal subsidies (Sτ)τ=t+1,t+2,… in the future is  
t t
1
S S b q S
∞
τ
+τ
τ=
= + ⋅ ⋅∑ . (A.5) 
The latter statement is obvious, because a strict (second) inequality in (A.3) immediately im-
plies the possibility to reduce one of the future subsidies St+τ (τ ≥ 1). Next, assume a point in 
time t so that (A.5) holds for t and t+1. Then 
t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1(A.5) (A.5)1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t t t
S S b q S b q q S S b q S q (S S)
r p 1S (1 q) S q (1 b) S S
1 r 1 r
S (1 r) S S (r p) S r (S S) S p.
∞
τ
+ + +τ + +
τ=
+ +
+
= + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ −
+
= ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅
+ +
⇔ = + ⋅ − ⋅ + = + ⋅ − − ⋅
∑
 (A.6) 
 
At time t = 0 we know from (4) that 0S S I X Y (p / r)= < − + ⋅  and therefore there exists ε > 0 
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such that S I X Y (p / r)≤ − + ⋅ − ε . Consider t to be an arbitrary point in time with tS ≤  
I X Y (p / r)− + ⋅ − ε  (e.g. t = 0). From (A.6) this implies 
2
t 1 t
2
t
t
p r p r p pS S r I X Y (I X) Y (I X) Y
r r p r p r p r p
r p p r r p pS r (I X) Y p (I X) Y
r p r p r p r p
S r .
+
⎛ ⎞ ⋅≤ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ε − − ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= − ⋅ε + − ⋅ + ⋅ − − − ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠
= − ⋅ε
 (A.7) 
Thus, as long as t 1S S+ >  the series t t 0, 1, ...(S ) =  of grants is strongly monotonically decreasing 
and the increment is at least r ⋅ ε . The latter statement particularly implicates the existence of 
a maximal point in time T with T 1 TS S S− > ≥ . Consequentially, Sτ = 0 for all τ ≥ T+1.  
Follow the rule (A.6) and let T the maximal time. Then 
T 1 T 1 T 1
p p(1 r) S S (r p) S S S 1 S S S
1 r 1 r− − −
⎛ ⎞
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + < ⇔ < ⋅ + ⇔ − < ⋅⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ . (A.8) 
For t = T−1 (A.5) holds and it follows: 
T 1 T T T T 1
p 1 rS S b q S S S S (S S)
1 r p− −
+
= + ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ ⇔ = − ⋅
+
. (A.9) 
To summarize, the optimal cutting rule is: 
0
t t
t 1 t t
t
S S,
1 r p(1 r) S S (r p) if S S,
1 r
1 r 1 r pS (S S) if S S S,
p 1 r
0 if S S.
+
=
+ +⎧
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + > ⋅⎪ +⎪
+ + +⎪
= − ⋅ < ≤ ⋅⎨
+⎪⎪ ≤⎪⎩
 (A.10) 
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